Water conflict analysis: The Nile River dispute

Sara Herrer Fernández

doi:10.22490/26655489.5877

Vol. 4 No. 8 (2022): Julio - Diciembre

Published 2022-07-28

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Artículos

Análisis del conflicto del agua: la disputa del río Nilo

DOI: https://doi.org/10.22490/26655489.5877

Sara Herrer Fernández UAB

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References

La cuenca del río Nilo es la fuente de vida de Egipto, Etiopía, Sudán y los países río arriba, principalmente como agua para la agricultura y la energía hidroeléctrica. El recurso es el centro de un desarrollo muy disputado entre los países río abajo y río arriba. En los últimos años, debido en gran parte al cambio climático y al rápido crecimiento de la población, se ha producido un aumento en el nivel del conflicto relacionado con la escasez de agua y el subsecuente agravamiento de la inseguridad alimentaria. Además, las masas de agua transfronterizas tienen una gestión hídrica aún más compleja, convirtiéndose en uno de los principales temas geopolíticos de la actualidad. Este conflicto es el resultado de la ambición de los principales países ribereños, en particular Egipto, Sudán, Etiopía y otras naciones río arriba, por reclamar una mayor parte de los suministros de agua disponibles en la cuenca. Precisamente por eso, una teoría del juego cooperativo proporciona información valiosa sobre las disputas estratégicas en relación con los recursos hídricos. En este artículo, se evalúan las estrategias no cooperativas para determinar los posibles resultados de la disputa.

keywords: hidropolítica, seguridad alimentaria, cambio climático, sequía, energía hidroeléctrica, cuencas fluviales transfronterizas, uso de aguas arriba, poder duro, poder blando, teoría del juego cooperativo, dilema del prisionero

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Herrer Fernández, S. (2022). Análisis del conflicto del agua: la disputa del río Nilo. Análisis Jurídico Político, 4(8), 83-112. https://doi.org/10.22490/26655489.5877

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