Water conflict analysis: The Nile River dispute

Sara Herrer Fernández

doi:10.22490/26655489.5877

Vol. 4 Núm. 8 (2022): Julio - Diciembre

Publicado 28-07-2022

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Water conflict analysis: The Nile River dispute

DOI: https://doi.org/10.22490/26655489.5877

Sara Herrer Fernández UAB

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The Nile River Basin is the source of life of Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Upstream countries, principally as water for agriculture and hydropower. The resource is the focus of much contested development between downstream and upstream countries. In recent years, largely due to climate change and rapid population growth, there has been an increasing level of conflict related to water scarcity and the consequent aggravation of food insecurity. Additionally, transboundary masses of water have an even more complex water management, becoming one of the main geopolitical issues of today. This conflict is the result of the ambition of the main riparian countries, notably Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and other upstream nations, to claim a greater share of the water supplies available in the watershed. That is precisely why a cooperative Game theory provides valuable insights into strategic disputes over water resources. In this paper, non-cooperative strategies are assessed to determine the possible outcomes of the dispute.

Palabras clave: hydropolitics, food security, climate change, drought, hydropower, transboundary river basins, upstream water use, hard power, soft power, cooperative game theory, prisoner's dilemma

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Herrer Fernández, S. (2022). Water conflict analysis: The Nile River dispute . Análisis Jurídico - Político, 4(8), 83-112. https://doi.org/10.22490/26655489.5877

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